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 2 Verbal influence 
Introduction 
For verbal influence to be effective, it has to master a communication trade-off 
(Fiedler, 2008). On one hand, influential communication must dare to state something new 
and informative that deviates from the communication partner’s old knowledge or opinion. 
On the other hand, effective communication has to conceal its manipulative purpose, in order 
to avoid reactance and inoculation effects (Brehm, 2000; McGuire, 1964; Engelkamp, Mohr 
& Mohr, 1985). The research reviewed in the present article suggests that simple verbal 
stimuli at the lexical level are ideally suited to meeting this double goal, because word stimuli 
carry substantial semantic information while often concealing the pragmatic purpose of 
communication. Words constitute neutral and natural units of information that can be freely 
combined to produce an infinite number of communicative acts. This flexibility and 
generative power of language as a symbol system (Glucksberg & Danks, 1975) is at the heart 
of virtually all verbal influence strategies, in politics, negotiation, scientific argumentation, 
advertising, deception, ingratiation, and education.  
Any expanded question, imperative command, or more elaborate text unit used to 
advertise an object or to request help may elicit reactance or suspicion. The many nice things 
a car dealer has to say about the qualities of a used car may be understood as a veridical 
description of the car, as an attempt to gain money, as a empty professional statement that is 
routinely repeated with each and every car, or even as plain deception. Likewise, sentence- or 
paragraph-like requests for help may be framed as an expression of misery, as a joke or role 
play, or a reflection of the laziness of someone, who might as well help himself or herself. 
Communication success will obviously depend on the recipient’s appraisal and evaluation of 
the pragmatic situation. An advertisement or request for help will fail if it raises the 
impression of a selfish, inadequate, unfair, or provocative influence attempt.  
Even when communicative acts do not run against the recipients own pragmatic 
interests, the very detection of an influence attempt may be sufficient to induce reactance or 
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an inoculation effect in the message recipient. Counter-arguments are often generated 
spontaneously if only the recipient of a communication is aware of an influence attempt. As 
spelled out in Brehm’s (1966) theory of reactance, any attempt to prescribe certain actions or 
to forego others will cause in the recipient a counter-tendency to regain his or her freedom of 
choice. It may therefore be not only necessary to let the speech act appear harmless or 
prosocial; it may even be necessary to fully distract the recipient from pragmatic thinking and 
to conceal the speech act as perfectly as possible. Thus, a useful strategy might be to make 
influence attempts either subliminal or subtle and impoverished enough to prevent the 
communication partner from drawing pragmatic inferences. 
Lexical stimuli are ideally suited for such influence strategies. Reading or hearing the 
isolated word “fairness” in a football stadium or on a package of coffee just raises the 
meaning of morality and social exchange, and maybe activates corresponding behavioral 
scripts. It hardly reveals any specific speech act. People exposed to lexical stimuli will rarely 
start reasoning whether “fairness” is an arrogant imperative, an expression of a moral value, 
an unfair attempt to exploit others’ cooperation, or a joke or irony. Likewise, lexical primes in 
advertising like “erotic”, “paradise” or “wellness” will hardly raise counter-arguments, or 
critical questions about the validity or pragmatic meaning of minimal verbal communications 
(Hansen & Wänke, 2011; Wänke, 2007). Such modest single-word stimuli neither come as 
promise, nor as ingratiation, deceptive strategy or pretentious assertion. People who are 
exposed to such unspecified communications will rarely engage in pragmatic reasoning about 
the advertiser’s goals or intentions; they will be simply influenced by the meaning and 
associative power of the lexical stimuli.  
Lexical Stimuli Trigger Implicit Cognition 
Verbal Influences as Priming Effects  
Using a fashionable term that is playing a central rule in contemporary social and 
cognitive psychology, the lexical-influence paradigm may be referred to as one-word priming. 
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It is hardly by coincidence that words constitute by far the largest class of stimuli used in the 
huge research industry of priming studies. Presenting a related prime (e.g., “professor”) 
before a target stimulus (e.g., “intelligent”) not only facilitates the recognition and naming of 
the target (as evident in faster response latency), or the classification of the target as word or 
non-word in a lexical decision task, or as positive versus negative in evaluative priming 
(Fazio, 2001; Fiedler, 2003; Klauer & Musch, 2003). Single-word primes have also been 
shown to bias subsequent judgments in the direction of the prime (Srull & Wyer, 1980). For 
example, in an affective-misattribution task (Payne, Hall, Cameron & Bishara, 2010), neutral 
targets (e.g., abstract drawing or pattern) were judged to be more pleasant or higher in 
aesthetic value, when the preceding prime words were of positive rather than negative 
valence. In action priming studies (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Spears, Postmes, Stapel, Koomen, 
Knippenberg & Scheepers, 1998), priming participants with the lexical stimulus “professor” 
was even shown to enhance their intellectual test performance, just as priming the concept of 
the “elderly” served to reduce the participants’ walking speed (Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 
1996).  
In a similar vein, priming of achievement-related words has been shown to enhance 
participants’ achievement motivation (Hart & Albarracìn, 2009). Distrust-related lexical 
primes induce critical mindsets and more elaborate processing styles (Schul & Mayo, 2004). 
When such words as “fairness”, “morality” and “solidarity” were presented subliminally, or 
generated in a kind of cross-word puzzle (Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Corneille & 
Yzerbyt, 2003), or remembered in an alleged verbal-learning task (Hertel & Fiedler, 1994), 
the rate of cooperative behavior in dilemma games increased. Conversely, words associated 
with aggressive meaning were shown to cause manifest aggressive behavior (Todorov & 
Bargh, 2002). With regard to therapy and interventions, Shalev and Bargh (2011) argue that 
priming-based interventions could be easily “… administered by multiple providers and 
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communication devises to regulate emotional states, increase adherence to treatment 
instructions, or activate mind-sets that facilitate adaptive functioning” [p. 488].  
In a memorable study by Gilovich (1981), several lexical primes were used to jointly 
activate different historical analogies supposed to bias the participants’ political judgments. 
The cover story of the political-judgment task described an allied country that was threatened 
by an aggressive neighboring country, and participants had to decide whether their own 
country (i.e., the US) should intervene. Depending on a few key words included in the cover 
story, participants were reminded either of the Vietnam War (implying that the US should not 
intervene) or of Hitler’s Blitzkrieg at the beginning of World War II (implying the US should 
intervene). Most participants actually voted for intervention in the latter condition but were 
reluctant to suggest an intervention in the former condition. 
A common denominator of all these impressive priming demonstrations is that the 
effective primes were compact word stimuli. One might quickly object that this merely 
reflects an artificial limitation of experimental research, namely, that the collection or 
construction of word stimuli is easier and causes less work than the construction of more 
elaborate text, scripts, film clips, or even more refined priming treatments. However, while 
this argument may be true, it should not be dismissed as artificial, because it provides a sound 
explanation of why word primes are so practical. They are freely and richly available in the 
lexicon. They can be easily combined in flexible ways to guide inference processes (such as 
historical analogies). They can be tried out (“pilot-tested”) quickly in reality or in mental 
simulations. And, last but not least, because no saccades are necessary to read a word, they 
can still be understood and exert their basic impact when the word primes are degraded 
through subtle or subliminal procedures. Thus, the methodological bias toward word priming 
in past research may reflect just a special case of the pragmatic bias toward word priming in 
verbal influence strategies. 
Beyond Priming Paradigms  
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It should be noted, though, that priming is by no means the only paradigm that 
highlights the power of lexical stimuli. The same could be said for the evaluative-conditioning 
paradigm (De Houwer, 2007). In those evaluative-conditioning studies in which verbal 
stimuli were used as USs (unconditional stimuli) to be paired with neutral CSs (conditional 
stimuli), the USs were almost always distinct words (for an overview, see Hofmann, De 
Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens & Crombez, 2010). In hardly any study were sentences, 
paragraphs, or narratives used as USs. Again, one might claim that this merely reflects 
researchers’ laziness or preference for simple and well-controlled stimuli. However, influence 
making in reality is also characterized by economy and the need to exert control over one’s 
communicative acts. It is therefore not surprising that in economic and political reality most 
conditioning-based influence or advertising strategies rely on commonly understood, handy 
word labels, such as trait adjectives, affective terms, or celebrity names, rather than more 
complicated syntactical and pragmatic constructions.  
In the false-memory paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1985), too, the most 
convenient and effective means of inducing falsely recalled or recognized stimuli has been the 
learning of lists of words revolving around a topical concept. For instance, exposure to a 
stimulus list that includes the words “dream”, “pillow”, “bed” and “night” will typically 
mislead a majority of participants to “remember” the semantic core meaning “sleep”, although 
this word was in fact not presented. Likewise, in the context of applied research in the legal 
context, demonstrations of false memories or reconstructive memory biases are often based 
on the manipulation of critical words in leading questions. In Loftus and Palmer’s (1974) 
seminal studies, for instance, participants were asked to estimate the speed of a car they had 
observed on video, in response to the question “How fast were the cars moving when they hit 
together/smashed together, bumped into each other, collided?” Speed estimates varied greatly 
as a function of the speed suggested by the meaning of the verb.  
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In psycholinguistics, the influence of language condensed in words is well known 
under the label of nominalization. In a frequently cited article – titled “truth is a linguistic 
question” – Bolinger (1973) provides various examples of nouns and composite nouns that 
presuppose a fact implicitly, rather than stating it explicitly. Terms like “insurance” or 
“defence ministry” presuppose implicitly that subscribing a contract warrants security or that 
the ministry is concerned with peace rather than starting war. Because these critical 
assumptions are not stated explicitly, the likelihood is low that the validity of the 
presupposition will be questioned and tested critically. Nominalization is a prominent 
linguistic tool for presupposition strategies.  
A number of recently developed instruments for the unobtrusive measurement of 
implicit attitudes, stereotypes, and prejudices are also built on lexical ground. As already 
mentioned, priming-based measures of implicit attitudes (e.g., measuring the speed required 
to evaluate positive or negative targets following male or female name primes) involve 
distinct words (unless they use pictures). The same holds for the implicit association test 
(IAT; Nosek, Greenwald & Banaji, 2005), which almost always consists of simple lexical (or 
pictorial) stimuli, the sorting speed of which is supposed to measure attitudes, stereotypes, or 
self-concepts. There is hardly any IAT application involving sentences, narratives, or other 
complex text variants, which would greatly complicate the interpretation of test results. For 
the same reason, influence attempts in everyday communication should be equivocal and hard 
to comprehend if they clearly focus on distinct keywords.  
The central role of compact keywords in comprehension and memory organization is 
evident in the way we organize emails or knowledge in external storage media, like a 
computer hard-disk. To administrate given information, we typically use word labels or 
nominal phrases to denote the subdirectories into which we store our information; using 
longer text units would be inconvenient and inefficient. To gather new information, in Google 
or encyclopedia, too, we use lexical keywords as search prompts. Whoever tried to google 
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longer text prompts will probably have experienced the disadvantage and confusion resulting 
from attempts to be better than words. One has no control about which words are given which 
weight by the search engine; syntactic relations will be ignored or misunderstood; what was 
meant as a conjunction of two prompts may be used disjunctively, and so forth.  
Constraints and Syntactic Interactions Between Word Primes  
This is not to say that lexical effects are not subject to syntactic and pragmatic 
constraints. In the priming literature, for instance, the notion of identity priming refers to the 
finding that the impact of a prime on the processing of a target word increases when they are 
identical rather than just similar (cf. Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998). Semantic-priming 
effects can be strengthened by letting more than one related prime precede a target (Balota & 
Paul, 1996), suggesting that repetition can intensify word-priming effects.  
Word ordering effects nicely illustrate the operation of simple and straightforward 
syntactic influences that operate on the lexical level. For instance, nouns were found to carry 
more weight for speakers of languages where nouns usually precede adjectives (e.g., 
Portuguese) than for speakers of languages where adjectives usually precede nouns (e.g., 
English). In two studies  (Percy, Sherman, Garcia-Marques, Mata, & Garcia-Marques, 2009), 
American and Portuguese participants were presented with either adjective-noun phrases (e.g., 
"The honest chef", "The honest journalist", "The happy chef”; presented in their native 
language and in the natural word order of the language), or visual stimuli whose features 
could be designated by an adjective and a noun (e.g., red circle, red square, blue square).  
When they were subsequently asked to make noun-conditioned frequency estimates 
(e.g., “Of all the chefs presented, how many were honest?”, “Of all the circles you saw, how 
many were red?”) as well as adjective-conditioned frequency estimates (e.g., “Of all the 
happy people presented, how many were chefs?”, “Of all the blue things you saw, how many 
were squares?”), participants from both samples were faster at making the noun-conditioned 
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estimates than the adjective-conditioned estimates, but this noun-advantage was greater for 
Portuguese participants compared to American participants.   
In other studies by these authors (Mata, Sherman, Percy, Garcia-Marques, 
& Garcia-Marques, 2012), Portuguese participants made more false recognitions than 
English-speakers for new items that shared the noun category with old items (e.g., blue square 
and green square). Also, Portuguese-speakers judged items that shared the noun category 
(e.g., blue square and green square) to be more similar than English-speakers did, whereas the 
opposite was the case for items that shared the adjective attribute (e.g., blue square and blue 
circle). These studies show that the impact of words on memory and judgment can be 
constrained by native language word order. 
Relational constraints come into play when lexical primes vary in abstractness or 
inclusiveness. Abstract and semantically broad primes are more likely to impact subsequent 
target responses than concrete and too specific primes, simply because more inclusive primes 
are semantically applicable to a broader range of targets. In the aforementioned research by 
Dijksterhuis et al. (1998), for instance, only the inclusive category label “professor” enhanced 
the participants intellectual performance, but not the specific prime “Einstein”, which is 
probably so specific that participants themselves are excluded from the prime’s domain. As a 
consequence, the “Einstein” prime caused a contrast effect, that is, a performance impairment. 
In a similar vein, the categorical prime “model” led to higher attractiveness self-ratings in 
female participants, whereas the specific name “Claudia Schiffer” led to lower self ratings. 
Schwarz and Bless’ (2007) inclusion-exclusion model provides a sensible account for these 
pronounced inclusiveness effects.  
The impact of word primes on target responses and on subsequent judgments and 
actions can also be moderated by strategic processes. As a general rule, all manipulations of 
the presentation context or the encoding task that serve to functionally separate the prime 
from the target will undermine the fusion of prime and target. A growing body of convergent 
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evidence shows that priming effects are reduced, eliminated or even reversed when the time 
interval between prime and target onset is too long (Hermans, Spruyt & Eelens, 2003), when 
primes and targets are hard to integrate or to form a compound (Estes & Jones, 2009), when 
primes are attended to and memorized as distinct entities (Weidemann, Huber & Shiffrin, 
2008), and especially when primes are actively responded to, separately from the target-
reaction task (Fiedler, Bluemke & Unkelbach, 2011; Liberman, Förster & Higgins, 2007; 
Sparrow & Wegner, 2007).  
Strategic moderation is also evident in the dependence of priming on the list context. 
Both the relatedness-proportion effect in semantic priming (Bodner & Masson, 2003) and the 
congruity-proportion effect in evaluative priming (Klauer, Rossnagel & Musch, 1997) testify 
to the adaptive flexibility in the way a prime is used. If there is a negative correlation between 
the meaning or valence of primes and targets in the stimulus context (e.g., if most targets 
following positive primes are negative and vic versa), participants can learn to invert the 
normal priming effect. In such a context, they can learn to react faster to targets that mismatch 
the prime in valence or semantic meaning.  
Thus, a number of pronounced interactions and contextual or strategic moderation 
effects highlight the fact that priming effects are not under rigid stimulus control. Rather, they 
lend themselves to communication strategies that take such context dependencies into 
account. However, crucially, the “grammar of priming” (Fiedler et al., 2011) must not be 
equated with the strict syntactic rules of language, which apply to higher-order text units. 
Verbal Influence Based on Strategic Uses of Linguistic Categories 
A growing number of empirical findings highlight the systematic impact of lexical 
stimuli on social influence processes. We believe that the reported evidence – which partly 
stems from studies conducted in our own lab and partly from others’ work on linguistic 
categories and their cognitive implications – will refute the sceptical argument that lexical 
analysis provides an impoverished and inadequate picture of language and verbal behavior 
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(Edwards & Potter, 1993). According to this view, counting and categorizing words can never 
do justice to the illocutionary and perlocutionary meaning of even the simplest speech act, to 
figurative language, and to the richness of elegance of narrative information.  
Although we share these beliefs in the beauty and uniqueness of creative language and 
literature, this aesthetic argument must not be confused with scientific evidence about the 
reliability and validity of measurable aspects of language. Objective measures of speaker 
intentions, semantic ambiguities, anaphoric references, stylistic tools, hidden messages 
between the lines, and conscious or unconscious violations of Gice’s (1975) maxims of 
communication would be hard to find. Moreover, many of these higher-order rhetoric means 
are so original and idiosyncratic that they hardly lend themselves to statistical analyses. In 
contrast, counting and categorizing words is simple and straightforward and can be easily 
accomplished by freely available software tools (Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzales & 
Booth, 2007; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). Even though – or exactly because – lexical 
analysis reduces the miraculous complexity of language to a few objectively assessable 
aspects, it has a real chance to capture the systematic relations that hold between language and 
behavior across people and situations. The empirical evidence below is meant to substantiate 
this notion.  
Implicit Verb Causality  
A long tradition of research on linguistic categories testifies to the strong and 
systematic constraints imposed by different word classes on language comprehension and 
cognitive inferences. In particular, the verbs and adjectives that make up the sentence 
predicates constrain the resulting attributions and evaluations. Numerous studies on implicit 
verb causality (Abelson & Kanouse, 1966; Brown & Fish, 1983; Fiedler & Semin, 1988; 
Garvey & Caramazza, 1974; Rudolph & Försterling, 1997) demonstrate that some verbs like 
help, attack, or insult suggest a cause in the sentence subject, whereas other verbs like admire, 
abhor, or hate imply object causation. Within the taxonomy of Semin and Fiedler’s (1988) 
 12 Verbal influence 
linguistic-category model (LCM), these two verb classes are referred to as interpretive-action 
verbs (IAV) and state verbs (SV), respectively. If Peter insults Mary, the causal origin is in 
Peter, but if Peter despises Mary, then Mary appears to be the cause of the same disrespecting 
behavior. The teacher rewards a student tells us something about an encouraging teacher, 
whereas The teacher admires a student points to an unusually smart student. The semantic 
correlation is strong and almost deterministic. Almost 90% of all IAV entries in the lexicon 
imply subject causation, whereas the vast majority of SVs suggest a cause in the sentence 
object.  
Just by choosing an IAT or SV for the sentence predicate, one can thus exert a strong 
influence on the attribution and evaluation of the protagonist’s behavior. Positive IAVs (help, 
encourage, save) and negative IAVs (hurt, cheat, insult) are appropriate means of 
communicating positive and negative subject intentions, respectively. SVs, in contrast, induce 
a re-attribution from the subject to the object. Negative SVs (hate, abhor, fear) provide 
excuses for the subject’s negative behavior by pointing to an external cause in the sentence 
object. Positive SVs (love, admire, long for) serve to relocate positive valence from the 
subject, who is only a passive patient or experiencer, to the object person or stimulus, who 
becomes the causal and evaluative origin. Thus, by choosing appropriate verbs, a journalist 
can either improve or devalue a politician’s image, a teacher can praise a student or himself, 
prosecutors can blame and defence attorneys excuse the same defendants’ behaviors (Schmid 
& Fiedler, 1998).  
Two boundary conditions facilitate the impact of implicit-verb causality on 
attributions and social judgments. First, many reference events and behaviors that are the 
topic of communicators are complex and ambiguous enough to allow for considerable 
variation in word use. Partners can describe their joint activities and conflicts at different verb 
levels; lawyers are free to use IAVs or SVs. Neither the wording of newspaper headlines nor 
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the predicates used in personal reviews or letters of recommendation are restricted to one 
particular word class.  
Secondly, and most importantly for the success of social influence, the grammatical 
verb type used in a sentence or utterance goes typically unnoticed. At the meta-cognitive 
level, neither speakers nor listeners are aware of the use of implicit verb causality as an 
influence strategy. These are exactly the conditions that render communications both 
informative (by reducing the ambiguity) and subtle (by concealing the influence strategy).  
Most published evidence on implicit verb causality (cf. Rudolph & Förderling, 1997) 
is restricted to questionnaires asking either for explicit causal ratings (Given the sentence, 
Sandra praises Mary, to what extent is the cause due to something about Peter or Mary?) or 
for pronoun disambiguation in a sentence completion task like Sandra praises Mary because 
she … Implicit causality is evident from the way in which the pronoun “she” interpreted, 
either as referring to Sandra or to Mary. Such semantic questionnaire studies with purely 
verbal stimuli reveal little about the role of language in the attribution of observed, extra-
linguistic behavior. Only very few studies have examined implicit-verb causality in the 
context of objectively given behaviors.  
Lexical strategies in prosecutors’ and defence attorneys’ final speeches. In one of  
the few exceptions, Schmid and Fiedler’s (1988) presented laypeople and lawyers with the 
evidence from court trials and asked different participants to take the perspective of either a 
prosecutor or a defence attorney. They were then asked to provide their final speech in a 
simulated court trial. These speeches were then coded for the occurrence of word classes used 
as predicates in sentences with the defendant as the subject. In this conversational context, the 
SV-rate was generally low, and positive IAVs were also hardly applicable to interpretations of 
the defendants’ crimes. However, as expected, the prevalence of negative IAVs – which 
suggest internally caused, intentional actions – was enhanced in the final speeches of 
prosecutors, whose goal was to blame the defendant. Defence attorneys, whose goal was to 
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avoid aggravating connotations, used fewer negative IAVs but resorted instead to SVs and 
adjectives referring to positive traits. Both laypeople and trained lawyers showed similar 
shifts in lexical strategies as a function of the accusing or excusing role they were to play. 
Subsequent research based deliberate manipulations of the verb types in otherwise invariant 
speeches showed that other people’s guilt judgments were actually affected by the 
manipulation (Schmid, Fiedler, Englich, Ehrenberger & Semin, 1996).  
The answer is in the question. Another paradigm, in which manifest social behavior 
was influenced by the implicit causality of verbs, was first developed by Semin, Rubini and 
Fiedler (1995) and later refined by Semin and DePoot (1997). The basic idea guiding this 
approach was the notion that the verb class used in a question (asked by a journalist, 
interviewer, lawyer, survey researcher) can have a marked influence on the answer (given by 
a politician, interviewee, witness, survey respondent). For example, when asked to explain 
why people read a certain newspaper or why they like a certain newspaper, they referred to 
their own internal reasons (interest, preference) in the former condition, but with external 
accounts (newspaper reputation or orientation) in the latter condition.  
Semin and DePoot (1997) asked their participants to “think about a specific occasion 
when you admired somebody” (SV) or “… when you defended somebody” (IAV). They were 
then asked to remember as precisely as possible how this experience unfolded and then to 
describe the episode in their own words. These free descriptions were then coded for the 
implicit causality, that is, whether the verbs used in the answer assigned the causal origin to 
the subject or object in the episode. The autobiographical memories solicited by IAV- and 
SV-questions differed systematically. Whereas IAV-questions led participants to report 
internally caused events, SV-questions solicited many more externally caused episodes. It was 
also evident that the behavioral episodes generated in response to SV questions were of 
clearly higher duration, likelihood of recurrence, stability of the depicted social relationship, 
and lower in contextual dependence than the episodes prompted by IAT-questions. 
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Further evidence reported by Semin and DePoot (1997) suggests that responders are 
not aware of the manipulations inherent in the questions and that the different narratives they 
produce when answering SV versus IAT questions affect the interpretations of others who 
listen to their answers. Altogether, these findings highlight the role of question answering in 
general, and the question verb in particular, in the formation of self-fulfilling prophecies and 
confirmation biases (Nickerson, 1998).  
Constructive influences on person judgments. Lexical influences not only affect the 
answers and related memories solicited by questions containing different verbs. They can also 
induce constructive errors and biases in memory and social judgment. Illustrative evidence 
comes from a series of experiments conducted by Fiedler, Armbruster, Nickel, Walther & 
Asbeck (1996). Participants first saw a TV discussion dealing with a consumer topic. They 
were then presented with a list of 12 questions asking whether one target discussant has 
shown 12 behaviors. Depending on the experimental conditions, these behaviors were 
expressed by positive IAVs, negative IAVs, positive SVs, or negative SVs. Several minutes 
later, participants had to rate the target on two sets of 12 trait adjectives that were matched in 
meaning to the verbs used for the preceding questioning treatment (e.g., attack and turn away 
matched to aggressive and arrogant). The aim of the study was to find out whether merely 
considering possible behaviors might induce constructive biases in the final trait judgments, 
even when judges had denied seeing many behaviors that the target actually had not shown.  
Indeed, merely construing the target in terms of possible behaviors, regardless of their 
truth value, resulted in strong constructive judgment biases, which were sensitive to the 
implicit causality of the verb prompts. Because IAVs imply subject causation, merely 
considering the target engaging in positive IAVs led to higher positive and lower negative 
trait ratings, whereas negative IAVs caused relatively more negative impressions. When the 
analysis was confined only to traits associated with correctly denied (actually false) 
behaviors, these constructive influences were similarly strong as in the overall analysis. Thus, 
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denying that the target has attacked others led to increased, rather than decreased ratings of 
the trait aggressive.   
Interestingly, when SVs were used for the questions treatment, the constructive biases 
pointed in the other direction. Thinking about negative target SVs (Did he abhor another 
discussant?) led to less negative target impressions, obviously because negative SVs suggest 
external excuses for negative behaviors. Conversely, positive SVs (e.g., admire) suggest 
external causes for positive behaviors and therefore led to less positive ratings. Again, the 
impact of merely considering the target in the light of different SVs was independent of the 
truth and semantic applicability of the verbs.  
Social exchange and fairness. Related to implicit causality is another difference 
between IAVs and SVs that has important implications for social interaction. As IAVs, but 
not SVs, imply that the subject is accountable for his or her actions, IAVs are more likely to 
invoke the principle of reciprocity or social exchange (Homans, 1958). Preliminary support 
for this notion comes from an unpublished study (Fiedler, 1993). Participants were asked to 
judge the impact of given behaviors expressed in simple IAV sentences (e.g., Tom insults 
Walter) or SV sentences (Tom disrespects Walter) on future behaviors involving the same 
two persons. Reciprocity was invoked by IAVs, such that after Tom’s negative action, it is 
now Walter’s turn to treat Tom negatively while Tom’s subsequent behavior is less likely to 
be negative. Given a negative state (hate, disrespect) in Tom, however, the likelihood is high 
that Tom will continue to treat Walter negatively. The high endurability and external causality 
implied by SVs are not compatible with immediate reciprocity.  
Linguistic Abstractness and Construal Level  
So far, we have been only concerned with two word classes, which trigger causal 
inferences and attributions. While IAVs (save, hurt) suggest a cause residing in the subject 
and an emotional consequence in the object, SVs (abhor, long for) suggest an emotion in the 
subject and a cause in the object. However, the vast majority of empirical studies motivated 
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by the linguistic-category model (Semin & Fiedler, 1988, 1991) are not concerned with 
causality but with implications of abstract versus concrete language (Vallacher & Wegner, 
1987). On one hand, descriptive action verbs (DAV) such as kiss, kick, or nod afford the most 
concrete word class. These ordinary words reveal little about the actor’s character. Their 
meaning depends superficially on concrete physical details (lips for kissing), but their deeper 
meaning and evaluation is strongly dependent on the situational context (which can render 
kicking mean or friendly). As a consequence, the DAVs facilitate inferences that the 
behaviors denoted by the verb are common (high consensus), object-specific (high in 
distinctiveness), short-lived (low in consistency) and unlikely to raise divergent 
interpretations or debates. In contrast, abstract predicates involving adjectives (ADJ) such as 
hostile, fair, or honest, suggest diagnostic person attributes (low consensus) that generalize 
across objects, situations and time (low  distinctiveness and high consistency). Moreover, 
ADJs cannot be observed directly but depend on subjective interpretations, which are often 
the focus of debate. 
In accordance with Kelley’s (1967) ANOVA model of attribution, the low consensus, 
low distinctiveness, and high consensus that characterizes abstracts ADJs is strongly 
suggestive of a dispositional cause within the subject of behavior. Indeed, ADJs and IAVs can 
be conceived as two different linguistic tools for inducing internal attribution, related to two 
different attribution theories. While Kelley’s attribution determinants consensus, 
distinctiveness, and consistency, are wired into the semantic meaning of ADJs, a critical 
semantic feature of IAVs is intentional control, which is the chief mediator of subject 
attribution in Jones and McGillis’ (1976) correspondent inference theory.  
Linguistic intergroup bias. Drawing on strategic changes in the abstractness of 
language use, Maass and her colleagues have initiated an impressive research program on the 
linguistic-intergroup bias (LIB; Maass, 1999; Maass, Milesi, Zabbini, & Stahlberg, 1995, 
Maass, Salvi, Arcuri & Semin, 1989). Language users tend to describe negative behaviors of 
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outgroups and positive behaviors of ingroups in abstract terms, thus suggesting internal 
origins and high stability of ingroup-serving information. In contrast, they tend to use 
concrete language to describe positive outgroup and negative ingroup behavior, thus reducing 
ingroup-threatening information to transitory and superficial factors.  
Convergent evidence for LIB has been found in such diverse contexts as political 
party discrimination (Anolli, Zurloni & Riva, 2006), gender talk (Fiedler, Semin & 
Finkenauer, 1993), modern racism (Schnake & Ruscher, 1998) and hostility between fan 
clubs and regional identity groups (Maass et al. 1989). It has been demonstrated, moreover, 
that judgments by receivers of communications contaminated with LIB are actually biased in 
the direction suggested by the lexical strategies. That is, receivers arrive at more positive 
(negative) impressions if the target group’s positive behaviors are described abstractly 
(concretely) and if their negative behaviors are described concretely (abstractly). It has also 
been shown that the communicator’s attitudes, motives, and affective states can be reliably 
diagnosed from the differential use of abstract and concrete predicates in self- and other 
descriptions (Beukeboom & Semin, 2006; Douglas & Sutton, 2006; Slatcher & Pennebaker, 
2006). 
A fruitful debate emerged about the mediating forces underlying the LIB. Is the 
tendency to enhance oneself or one’s ingroup the major motive that drives linguistic 
abstractness? Or does the phenomenon in fact reflect a linguistic expectancy bias (Wigboldus, 
Semin & Spears, 2000), such that communicators tend to express expected information in 
more abstract terms than unexpected information. As long as ingroup-serving information is 
more expected than outgroup-serving information (because one expects the ingroup to be 
positive), the predictions are the same. However, when communications refer to unexpected 
ingroup deficits and expected outgroup assets, the available evidence suggests that 
expectancies override motivated thinking.  
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In any case, this research program highlights the systematic consequences of lexical 
influence strategies, which meet the criterion of being both informative and subtle. The LIB-
strategy is informative because it relies on commonly understood implications of abstract and 
concrete words. At the same time, it is subtle because language users are unlikely and hardly 
able to monitor the frequency distribution of predicates belonging to different linguistic 
categories. As a consequence, influential communications need not resort to such direct 
strategies as lying or lop-sided arguments that blatantly reveal the communicators goals and 
intentions. They can rather rely on the common ground of all language users’ knowledge of 
knowledge built into the lexicon.  
Construal-level effects. The explanatory power of linguistic abstraction is immense. 
One of the most fertile and successful research programs of the last decade, construal level 
theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003), testifies to the manifold consequences of abstract versus 
concrete representations. Abstract, high-level construals lead to simplified, low-dimensional 
judgments that highlight the idealized desirability of action goals and the global features of 
decision targets. Concrete, low-level construals, in contrast, result in more complex, multi-
dimensional representations that take the feasibility of goals and local features of decision 
targets into account.  
For example, it has been shown that the fundamental attribution error – that is, the 
generalized bias toward internal attributions in terms of trait-like dispositions – is more 
pronounced when behaviors are observed from a distant perspective, which is supposed to 
induce a high level of construal. Carrying this argument one step further, one can predict that 
(linguistic) abstraction produces the so-called actor-observer bias (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). 
When observers explain other people’s behavior from a distance, they should form more 
abstract representations leading to more dispositional attributions than actors explaining their 
own behavior from a proximal perspective. Linguistic analysis of self-referent and other-
referent coding behavior descriptions support exactly this prediction (Fiedler et al., 1995; 
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Fiedler, Semin & Koppetsch, 1991; Semin & Fiedler, 1989). Abstract predicates in general, 
and dispositional ADJs in particular, are more prevalent in free descriptions of others or 
outgroups compared to verbalizations of one’s own or one’s ingroup’s behavior.  
Another noteworthy function of abstract language is the regulation of social distance 
and power. Research conducted and reviewed by Semin (2007) indicates that abstract words 
let social relations appear more distant than concrete words and abstract terms are more 
applicable and considered more appropriate for distant relations than concrete words. Thus, 
somebody who does not follow an invitation might excuse his decline with reference to 
feeling inappropriate (keeping high distance) or having to go to the dentist (low distance). In 
a related vein, high-level construal using abstract words serves to indicate high status or 
power (Smith & Trope, 2006).  
The Communicative Impact of Specific Words  
The impact of lexical stimuli is by no means confined to differences between 
grammatical word classes, such as DAV, IAV, SV, and ADJ, or nouns that were recently 
shown to trigger even more dispositional inferences than ADJs (Carnaghi, Maass, Gresta, 
Bianchi, Cadinu & Arcuri, 2008). Thus, saying that somebody is a homosexual implies even 
more stable and deeply anchored a disposition than saying that somebody is homosexual.  
With regard to the power of specific words, for instance, an intriguing demonstration is 
that why- and how-questions can be used to induce high-level or low-level construals (Torelli 
& Kaikati, 2009), respectively, or different modes of motivation regulation (promotion vs. 
prevention focus; Freitas, Gollwitzer & Trope, 2004). “Why” is an invitation to think about 
long-term goals and essentialist reasons, whereas “How” asks for incidental details and 
unintended side-effects. In a similar vein, remembering how one felt happy in the past 
increases one’s current life satisfaction, whereas reasoning about why one felt happy causes a 
contrast effect, that is, a decrease in current satisfaction (Strack, Schwarz & Gschneidinger, 
1985). 
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Specific words trigger autobiographical memories. In a study aimed at understanding 
the positive correlations between all four distance aspects distinguished in construal-level 
theory (i.e., temporal, spatial, social, and probability distance), Fiedler, Jung, Wänke and 
Alexopoulos (2012) have discovered the key role played by verbal prompts. When specific 
action verbs were used as prompts to retrieve past memories or generate future construals, the 
verb-solicited scenarios exhibited a natural ecological correlation of all four distance aspects. 
Those reference events that were high (low) in temporal and probability distance also tended 
to be high (low) in spatial and social distance and vice versa. Moreover, the memories and 
construals solicited by particular verb prompts in different participants were highly similar in 
terms of their psychological distance. Similar findings were obtained by Fiedler and De 
Molière (2012) for noun prompts denoting high versus low power (e.g., father vs. son), which 
led to high versus low distance construals, respectively. These findings highlight the 
possibility that lexical stimuli can determine retrieval and cognitive construction processes. 
Specific words as diagnostic tools. Given the causal impact of verb prompts on 
cognitive and mnemonic inference processes, it is not too surprising that verb stimuli can also 
inform diagnostic inferences. For example, the abstractness of positive and negative words 
used to describe oneself and others, or ingroups and outgroups, has been shown to reveal the 
communicators’ attitudes toward the target person or group (Douglas & Sutton, 2006). In a 
similar vein, the prevalence of abstract adjectives expressing stable traits in partner-related 
communication is predictive of relationship quality (Fiedler, Semin & Koppetsch, 1991). Or, 
variation in linguistic abstractness affords a measure of political attributes implicit in political 
conversation (Anolli et al., 2006). 
In an intriguing research program, Pennebaker and colleagues have recently shown that 
even the tiniest everyday words – called “chunk words” (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007) – carry 
an enormous amount of diagnostic and prognostic information. The prevalence of such 
abundantly used words like first- or third-person pronouns, determinate and indeterminate 
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articles, prepositions or seemingly empty filler words was shown to be indicative of people’s 
psychic state and the veracity of their communications. For example, an enhanced rate of the 
first person singular (I, me) expresses low personal distance and therefore indicates positive 
attitudes and true, non-deceptive communications. Moreover, studies dealing with specific 
cultural and historical events have found linguistic markers of psychological change 
surrounding September 11, 2001 (Cohn, Mehl & Pennebaker, 2004) or discovered words that 
characterize the poetry of suicidal and non-suicidal poets (Stirman, & Pennebaker, 2001). The 
development of efficient and easily available computer tools for the lexical analysis of even 
huge text corpora greatly facilitates the growth of this promising and fruitful research on 
language as a useful diagnostic instrument.  
Concluding Remarks 
The evidence on “chunk words” as indicators of psychic states, optimistic versus 
pessimistic attitudes, deception, and self concepts (Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer, 2003) 
reiterates, and complements, the central message of this chapter. Useful communications 
should be both informative and subtle. Apparently, this twofold condition renders 
communications not only effective and influential, but also revealing about the 
communicators’ motives and personality. The strategic use of words and word classes may be 
of more diagnostic value than the communicators’ explicit declarations and self-referent 
attributions.  
Throughout this chapter, we have provided evidence for lexical stimuli as a basic level 
of verbal influence. Analogous to Rosch’s (1975) notion of basic-level categories in memory 
and cognitive development, lexical language units seem to provide optimal solutions for the 
trade-offs of social communication. Words informative enough to carry substantial meaning 
but elementary and flexible enough to be combined in many different ways. Words meanings 
are determinate enough to trigger evaluations and attributions but indeterminate enough to be 
more or less applicable to many different target objects and persons.  
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The studies we have reviewed testify to the ability of words to bring about social 
influence. Words afford distinct and powerful primes that trigger mental processes and 
manifest action. They serve as unconditional and conditional stimuli in associative and 
instrumental learning tasks. Lexical labels constrain the processes of causal and dispositional 
attribution, the formation of false memories, the retrieval of genuine information from auto-
biographical memory, and the construal of future plans and fantasies. And last but not least, 
they lend themselves as easily assessable units in diagnostic procedures of content analysis 
and measurement of communicator goals, intentions, and affective states.  
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